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Independent Federal Inquiry in Habeas Corpus Cases: When is a State Court
Factual Determination Not Fairly Supported by the Record Under 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(8)?
I. INTRODUCTION
The writ of habeas corpus, the "Great Writ," has its roots deep in
English common law. "It is of immemorial antiquity, an instance of its
use occurring in the thirty-third year of Edward I."' The Great Writ is
recognized in the United States Constitution,2 and it was incorporated
into the first grant of federal court jurisdiction.3 Federal habeas corpus
extended only to federal prisoners until 1867, when it was extended to
state prisoners.4 This extension of federal habeas corpus to state prison-
ers is contained in section 2254 of the United States Code.5
Section 2254 incorporates certain aspects of case law as developed by
the United States Supreme Court. In dictum in Frank v. Magnum,6 the
United States Supreme Court gave a clear indication that independent
federal inquiry into the facts of a habeas corpus case is sometimes war-
ranted.7 In Brown v. Alien,8 the Court attempted to set minimal stan-
dards for determining when a federal evidentiary hearing was necessary,
but these were not adequate.9 Finally, in Townsend v. Sain,'0 the Court
set out five specific situations in which a federal court must grant a de
novo evidentiary hearing to a state prisoner seeking federal habeas
corpus.'" The Court also articulated a sixth open-ended category. These
and other situations were embodied in section 2254(d) of the United
States Code.' 2
1. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (quoting Secretary of State for Home Affairs v.
O'Brien, 1923 A.C. 603, 609).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
3. Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82.
4. Act of February 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385; see Note, Developments in the Law - Federal
Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1038, 1-114 (1970).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982).
6. 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
7. Id. at 335-36.
8. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
9. Note, supra note 4, at 1117.
10. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
11. Id. at 313.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982). The statute provides in pertinent part:
(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain
an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitu-
tion or laws or treaties of the United States.
1
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The subject of this comment is section 2254(d)(8) which provides that
a federal court need not presume correct a state court factual determina-
tion if such factual determination is not fairly supported by the record.
Under subsection (8), the state prisoner first fnust produce that part of
the state court record "pertinent to a determination of the sufficiency of
the evidence to support such factual determination."13 Then, after con-
sidering "such part of the record as a whole,"14 the federal court need
not presume correct the state court factual determination if it "concludes
that such factual determination is not fairly supported by the record."15
In particular, this comment examines the difficulties created by the
United States Supreme Court's failure to articulate a standard for judg-
ing when a state court factual determination is not fairly supported by
the record. One federal circuit judge has suggested that the "any evi-
dence" standard be applied to section 2254(d)(8). Another such judge
and several commentators have suggested that the "clearly erroneous"
standard used in federal appellate review of factual determinations by
federal courts be applied to determine when a state court factual determi-
(d) In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ of habeas
corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination after a
hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court of competent jurisdiction in a
proceeding to which the applicant for the writ and the State or an officer or agent thereof were
parties, evidenced by a written finding, written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written
indicia, shall be presumed to be correct, unless the applicant shall establish or it shall otherwise
appear, or the respondent shall admit-
(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the State court hearing;
(2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the State court was not adequate to afford a
full and fair hearing;
(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at the State court hearing;
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or over the person of the
applicant in the State court proceeding;
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in deprivation of his constitu-
tional right, failed to appoint counsel to represent him in the State court proceeding;
(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing in the State court
proceeding; or
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the State court proceeding;
(8) or unless that part of the record of the State court proceeding in which the determina-
tion of such factual issue was made, pertinent to a determination of the sufficiency of the evi-
dence to support such factual determination, is produced as provided for hereinafter, and the
Federal court on a consideration of such part of the record as a whole concludes that such
factual determination is not fairly supported by the record; And in an evidentiary hearing in the
proceeding in the Federal court, when due proof of such factual determination has been made,
unless the existence of one or more of the circumstances respectively set forth in paragraphs
number (1) to (7), inclusive, is shown by the applicant, otherwise appears, or is admitted by the
respondent, or unless the court concludes pursuant to the provisions of paragraph numbered (8)
that the record in the State court proceeding, considered as a whole, does not fairly support
such factual determination, the burden shall rest upon the applicant to establish by convincing
evidence that the factual determination by the State court was erroneous.
See infra notes 26-32 and accompanying text for the discussion of the extent to which the Townsend
circumstances are incorporated into section 2254(d).
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nation is not fairly supported by the record. This comment suggests that
adoption of either of these standards would be inappropriate; rather, a
standard tailored to the unique nature of habeas corpus is required.
Part II of this comment will examine, in more detail, the history of
section 2254(d). Parts III and IV will explain the distinction among
questions of fact, mixed questions of fact and law, and questions of law in
the context of recent Supreme Court cases applying section 2254(d)(8).
Part V will examine the possible use of either the "any evidence" stan-
dard or the "clearly erroneous" standard to determine when a state court
finding of fact is not fairly supported by the record. Part VI will draw
some conclusions regarding the use of these standards. Throughout this
comment, it is important to be mindful that section 2254(d) refers to
federal habeas corpus review of state court factual determinations, i.e.,
"between systems" review, as opposed to federal appellate review of fed-
eral court factual determinations, i.e., "within system" review.
II. HISTORY OF SECTION 2254(d)
In his concurring opinion to Brown v. Allen, 6 a 1953 habeas corpus
case, Justice Jackson noted that in 1952, 541 petitions for habeas corpus
had been filed in federal district courts.17 He complained of "progressive
trivialization of the writ until floods of stale, frivolous and repetitious
petitions inundate the docket of the lower courts and swell our own." 18
In 1959, and again in 1963, the Committee on Habeas Corpus of the
Judicial Conference of the United States drafted bills restricting state
prisoners' applications for the writ.19 These drafts were embodied in bills
before Congress, but only House approval could be obtained.2' In 1966,
the 89th Congress enacted the current section 2254(d),2 ' the language of
which was adopted almost verbatim from a bill drafted by the Committee
on Habeas Corpus and accepted by the Judicial Conference in 1965.22
Review by a three-judge panel of writs issued was not part of the legisla-
tion that Congress enacted due to the withdrawal by the Judicial Confer-
ence of its prior favorable recommendation of the provision because of
16. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
17. Id. at 536 n.8 (Jackson, J., concurring).
18. Id. at 536.
19. S. REP. No. 1797, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
3663. Report of the Committee on Habeas Corpus to the Judicial Conference of the United States.
20. Id.
21. Act of November 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-711, § 2, 80 Stat. 1105.
22. S. REP. No. 1797, supra note 19, at 4 (Letter from Judge Phillips, United States Court of
Appeals, Tenth Circuit, as Chairman of the Committee on Habeas Corpus of the Judicial Conference
of the United States, to Senator Tydings, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judi-
cial Machinery).
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the administrative burdens it would create.23
Justice Powell, in Cuyler v. Sullivan,24 stated that the Townsend v. Sain
opinion was the precursor to section 2254(d).25 Townsend set out six
circumstances which required a federal habeas corpus court to grant an
evidentiary hearing to a state prisoner seeking the writ.2 6 The language
of the statute lists eight possible deficiencies in state court fact findings,
and all of the Townsend circumstances are subsumed thereunder. 27
However, as Professor Bator points out, the statutory criteria and the
Townsend circumstances do not address exactly the same issue.28 The
latter define when a federal evidentiary hearing is mandatory, while the
former are relevant to whether state court findings of fact are presumed
to be correct.
Further, if none of the eight [statutory] deficiencies is shown, the effect of
this is, not to negate the power of the judge to call for a hearing, but...
to shift to the petitioner the burden to show [by convincing evidence] at a
hearing that the state findings [of fact] were erroneous.29
Thus, even though some of the criteria in section 2254(d) are identical to
the Townsend circumstances, the thrust of the statute and the thrust of
the case are not identical. "[T]he language of the amendment apparently
assumes that the decision to hold an evidentiary hearing has already been
made. . ., [but] [i]ndirectly the statutory language and the Townsend
rules do reinforce each other."30 If there is no longer a statutory pre-
sumption of correctness for a state court finding of fact, Townsend would
seem to require the federal judge to hold a hearing to make conclusions
of fact.31 On the other hand, if one of the Townsend circumstances
23. Id. at 304. These burdens included increased travel time for lower federal judges and in-
creased workload for the Court, since panel review was by writ of certiorari to the Court.
24. 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
25. Id. at 341.
26. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963). These six circumstances are:
If(1) the merits of the factual dispute were-not resolved in the state hearing; (2) the state factual
determination is not fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure
employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a
substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not adequately
developed at the state-court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact
did not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing.
Id.
27. The amendment adds three criteria including: the state court lacked subject matter jur-
sidiction, the state court unconstitutionally failed to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant, and
the state court otherwise denied the applicant due process of law. The Townsend circumstance of a
"substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence" does not appear in the statute but would seem
to be subsumed under the statutory criterion of "material facts were not adequately developed in the
state court," also a Townsend circumstance. For a similar discussion, see Note, supra note 4, at
1141.
28. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER's THE FED-
ERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1505 & n.8 (2d ed. 1973).
29. Id.
30. Note, supra note 4, at 1141-42.
31. Id. at 1142.
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shows a state conclusion to be unreliable, such a conclusion should be
given no weight in the federal hearing.32
It is clear that the language of section 2254(d) was simply adopted by
Congress from the bill drafted by the Judicial Conference's habeas
corpus committee. Because of this, it can be said that to the extent the
Judicial Conference represents the views of the federal judiciary, any
congressional purpose for the enactment of section 2254(d) gleaned from
the legislative history is really the purpose of the federal judiciary. This
assertion is supported by the fact that references in the body of the senate
report regarding the rationale for enacting section 2254(d) parallel those
found in a letter, incorporated into the senate report, written by the
chairman of the Judicial Conference Committee on Habeas Corpus to the
chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery.33
The bill enacting section 2254(d) and other amendments to section
2254 also contained amendments to section 2244 of the same title.34
Judge Phillips, as chairman of the Habeas Corpus Committee, stated that
the bill had a dual purpose, "to prevent the abuse of the writ of habeas
corpus by persons in custody under judgments of [s]tate courts in habeas
proceedings in [fjederal courts, and to expedite the disposition of non-
meritorious and repetitious applications for the writ in [f]ederal courts by
[s]tate court prisoners.135 These purposes were to be attained,
by provisions for a qualified application of the doctrine of res judicata in
[f]ederal court habeas corpus proceedings brought by [s]tate prisioners,
by provisions according a presumption of correctness to factual determi-
nations made at a hearing on the merits by [s]tate courts and by provi-
sions with respect to the burden of proof in [flederal court proceedings
for habeas corpus by [s]tate prisioners.36
The amendments to section 2244 are the provisions for a qualified appli-
cation of the doctrine of res judicata, while section 2254(d) represents the
other two provisions.37
Most significantly, Judge Phillips indicated the need for the legislation
was demonstrated by practical considerations. 3 He noted that applica-
tions for the writ by state prisoners in federal court increased from 134 in
1941, to 814 in 1957, to 3,248 in 1964, to 3,773 for the first nine months
of fiscal 1966, while more than ninety-five percent of such applications
were held to be without merit.39 These practical considerations underlie
32. Id.
33. S. REP. No. 1797, supra note 19, at 4.
34. Act of November 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-711, § 1, 80 Stat. 1104.
35. S. REP. No. 1797, supra note 19, at 4.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 5.
38. Id. at 5-6.
39. Id.
5
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the amendments to both section 2244 and section 2254, since there is no
indication that they apply to just one or the other.'
The same purposes set out by Judge Phillips are reflected in the body
of the senate report itself.41 Some argument can be made that the senate
report was basing only the amendments to section 2244 on the practical
considerations of the heavy burden placed on federal courts by increased
habeas applications.42 This construction is not likely, however, given
Judge Phillips' indication that practical considerations underlay the
amendments to both sections 2244 and 2254. Since the enactment of the
amendments to these two sections, applications for the writ by state pri-
sioners have remained relatively constant, at least since 1970, averaging
about 7,800 per year.43
The senate report also notes that the legislation,
will be a strong inducement to the [s]tates that have not already done so
to provide adequate postconviction remedies and procedures and to make
and keep available records and evidentiary matter in criminal and post-
conviction proceedings, and to the [s]tate courts in criminal proceedings
to safeguard the constitutional rights of defendants.44
There was no discussion of the bill on the floor of either house prior to its
enactment. 45
The legislative history shows that section 2254(d) was a means to the
dual ends of preventing the abuse of the writ of habeas corpus by state
prisoners and of facilitating the disposition of nonmeritorious and repeti-
tious applications for the writ. Underlying these purposes was the practi-
cal consideration that the increasing number of habeas applications was
felt to be overburdening the federal courts. This legislation was also in-
tended to improve state criminal justice systems by inducing the states to
develop adequate post-conviction remedies, to make permanent eviden-
tiary records in criminal and post-conviction proceedings, and to make
state courts more responsive to the constitutional rights of defendants.
These improvements in state courts would, presumably, result in reduc-
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1-4.
42. Id. at 2-3.
43.
Year 1966a 1967a 1968a 1969a 1970a 1971a 1972a
5,339 6,201 6,488 7,359 9,063 8,372 7,949
1973a 1974a 1975a 1976a 1977b 1978b 1979a
7,784 7,626 7,843 7,833 6,866 7,033 7,123
1980r 1981d 1982c
7,029 8,004 8,379
44. S. REP. No. 1797, supra note 19, at 3 (quoting Report of the Committee on Habeas Corpus
of the Judicial Conference of the United States, which report was incorporated into the senate
report).
45. 112 CONG. REc. 21,754 (House), 27,974 (Senate) (1966).
6
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ing the number of writs filed in federal courts. Because section 2254(d)
was essentially judicially drafted with the above purposes in mind, it can
be said that it represents a shift in judicial policy. That is, section
2254(d) is a shift from the liberating view of Townsend in which the pur-
pose of the circumstances was to make mandatory an evidentiary hearing
in federal courts, to a desire to stem an apparent flood of habeas corpus
applications. It must be said that section 2254(d) was not immediately
effective in reducing the number of applications for the writ, since appli-
cations approximately tripled in the four years after its enactment. 4
However, the legislation may have had the intended effect of improving
state court practices and procedures.
In the case of Summer v. Mata,47 (Mata 1), the Court referred several
times to congressional intent in the enactment of section 2254(d) as sup-
port for giving a high degree of deference to state court findings of fact.48
However, in Mata I the legislative history is never cited, nor does the
Court acknowledge the fact that section 2254(d) is the enactment of a bill
drafted by the Judicial Conference, generally incorporating the Court's
own decision in Townsend. While practical considerations of the rapidly
rising number of habeas corpus applications underlay the enactment of
section 2254(d), such considerations are absent in the Court's restrictive
view of that section in Mata I. Rather, the Court asserts that federal
habeas corpus has been a source of friction between state and federal
courts, and "Congress obviously meant to alleviate some of that friction
when it enacted subsection (d). . . ,,.9 However, there is no authority
offered in support of this assertion. It seems the Court is only offering its
view of state court-federal court relations and its desire to use section
2254(d) as a means to reduce a perception of friction between the two
court systems. Finally, the Court stated that the amendments were in-
tended by Congress to limit the federal courts' exercise of habeas juris-
diction.5 0 The Mata I decision would clearly serve this end regardless of
whether Congress actually had such an intention.
III. QUESTIONS OF FACT, MIXED QUESTIONS, QUESTIONS OF LAW
Section 2254(d) requires a federal habeas court to accord a presump-
tion of correctness to a state court determination of a factual issue after a
hearing on the merits, regardless of whether such factual issue was deter-
mined by a state trial court or a state appellate court.51 The statute also
46. See statistics cited supra note 43.
47. 449 U.S. 539 (1981).
48. Id. at 547 & n.2, 550 & n.3, 552. For a more detailed discussion of the case, see infra notes
57-72 and accompanying text.
49. Id. at 550.
50. Id. at 548.
51. Id. at 546-47.
7
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provides that the presumption can be rebutted if the federal court con-
cludes such factual determination is not fairly supported by the record. 2
Because state determinations of factual issues are presumed correct, it
is important to define what a factual issue is and distinguish it from other
issues. Issues of fact "are termed basic, primary, or historical facts: facts
'in the sense of a recital of external events and the credibility of their
narrators. . . .' ,,3 Mixed questions of fact and law require that a legal
standard be applied to the historical fact determinations; thus mixed
questions are distinct from issues of fact. 4 Questions of law can be de-
fined as the abstract determination of the proper legal standard to be
applied. "The Court has. . . noted the vexing nature of the distinction
between questions of fact and questions of law." 55
Regardless of the difficulty of the distinction between questions of fact,
mixed questions, and questions of law, the categorization of an issue as
one of the three is critical, because "[ilt is the [federal] district judge's
duty to apply the applicable federal law to the state court fact findings
independently. The state conclusions of law may not be given binding
weight on habeas." 56
In Mata I, a case involving one inmate murdering another, the defend-
ant contended for the first time in his direct appeal to the California
Court of Appeal that the pretrial photographic identification employed
by the state police was impermissibly suggestive. The defendant con-
tended that this was in violation of the due process of law guarantee of
the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. 7 The de-
fendant did not take direct appeal to the California Supreme Court, but
instead sought relief in state habeas corpus proceedings.58 He exhausted
his remedies in those proceedings without relief, whereupon he sought a
writ of habeas corpus in the district court, but the petition was denied. 9
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.'
The Court vacated the Ninth Circuit judgment and remanded.61
In its initial opinion, the Ninth Circuit never mentioned section
2254.62 Despite this, it was clear to the Court that the Ninth Circuit had
not implicitly relied on paragraphs one through seven of section 2254(d),
52. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(8) (1982).
53. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 309 n.6 (1963) (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 506
(1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.)).
54. Id.
55. Pullman-Standard, Inc. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982).
56. Townsend, 372 U.S. at 318.
57. Mata I, 449 U.S. at 541-42.
58. Id. at 542.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 543.
61. Id. at 552.
62. Mata v. Sumner, 611 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1979), vacated, 449 U.S 539 (1981).
8
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and the failure to consider section 2254 made it impossible to tell
whether the circuit court relied on paragraph eight. 3 Even if the
Supreme Court could have implied that the Ninth Circuit relied on sec-
tion 2254(d)(8), i.e., the state appellate court's findings of fact were not
fairly supported by the record, this would not have been sufficient, nor
would a boilerplate reference to section 2254(d)(8) have been sufficient. 4
The Court concluded that Congress "contemplated at least some rea-
soned written references to § 2254(d) and the state-court findings."65 In
this regard, the Court made reference to Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure wherein a district court is required, following a bench
trial, to specifically find the facts and separately make a statement of
conclusions of law thereon. 6 Rule 52 governs the effect of findings of
fact made by a lower federal court judge, sitting without a jury, on fed-
eral appellate court review.67 The Court held that a habeas court must
include in its opinion granting the writ its reasoning leading to the con-
clusion that one of the eight paragraphs of section 2254(d) rebutted the
presumption of correctness accorded to state court fact findings.6"
Justice Brennan's dissent, joined by two Justices, points out that the
Ninth Circuit's failure to mention section 2254(d) resulted from the peti-
tioner's failure to raise the argument.69 More importantly, the dissent
contended that the Ninth Circuit and the California Court of Appeal did
not disagree over the historical facts.7 0 Rather, the issue of the sugges-
tiveness of the photo identification procedure was a mixed question of
fact and law falling outside the limitations of section 2254(d). 1s Other
Supreme Court cases had held similarly on the related issue of a show-up
identification procedure and on other issues.7 2
Professor Reynolds argued that Mata I could result in two possible




67. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
68. 449 U.S. at 549.
69. Id. at 553-54 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 556.
71. Id. at 557.
72. Id. at 557-58. In Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), defendant was convicted of rape on
evidence which included testimony concerning the victim's identification of defendant at a sta-
tionhouse show-up. Defendant contended that the show-up was so suggestive that it violated his due
process rights. The Court held that his due process rights had not been violated. Id. at 199-201.
The Court could reach the merits because the dispute was not over elemental facts, rather it was over
"the constitutional significance attached to them." Id. at 193 n.3. In Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S.
387 (1977), the police questioned defendant during a 160 mile automobile ride, despite having agreed
not to do so. Defendant made incriminating statements and led police to the victim's body. The
question of waiver was found to be a mixed question; thus, 2254(d) was not applicable. Id. at 397 &
n.4. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) (whether lawyers' representation of defendant and
co-defendant at separate trials was conflict of interest held to be a mixed question not covered by
2254(d)).
9
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outcomes.73 The first was that the constitutionality of photo identifica-
tion procedures would be precluded from habeas review.74 Alternatively,
identification questions would be treated as factual matters; thus, state
court findings on such questions would be presumed correct under sec-
tion 2254(d).75 Professor Reynolds feared that the second approach
could lead to the categorization of other issues as factual, and thereby
subject to the statute's presumption of correctness. 76 This would serve
the Court's restrictive view of habeas corpus, 77 but it raises the danger
that issues of law could be swallowed up by issues of fact in the field of
habeas corpus. Professor Reynolds' fears have been allayed, but not
completely dispelled.
On remand from Mata I, the Ninth Circuit took Justice Brennan's
position that whether the pretrial photographic identification was imper-
missibly suggestive was a mixed determination of fact and law not subject
to section 2254(d).7 s The result was a reversal of the district court.7 9
In its second Sumner v. Mata opinion, (Mata I1), the Court again va-
cated the Ninth Circuit judgment and remanded.8" In its per curiam
opinion, the Court attempted to dispel any notion that the suggestiveness
of a photo identification procedure was an issue of fact8" by stating, "[w]e
agree with the Court of Appeals that the ultimate question as to the con-
stitutionality of the pretrial identification procedures used in this case is a
mixed question of law and fact that is not governed by § 2254(d)." 82
Nevertheless, the Court found section 2254(d) was applicable to the case.
The Court stated:
[T]he questions of fact that underlie this ultimate conclusion are gov-
erned by the statutory presumption as our earlier opinion made clear.
Thus, whether the witnesses in this case had an opportunity to observe
the crime or were too distracted; whether the witnesses gave a detailed,
accurate description; and whether the witnesses were under pressure
from prison officials or others are all questions of fact as to which the
73. Reynolds, Sumner v. Mata" Twilight's Last Gleaming for Federal Habeas Corpus Review of
State Court Convictions? Speculations on the Future of the Great Writ, 4 U. ARK. LrrrLE ROCK L.J.
289, 298 (1981).
74. Id. This was the approach taken in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), where "questions
concerning the constitutionality of evidence seized may not be entertained [on habeas] after full and




78. Mata v. Sumner, 649 F.2d 713 (9th Cir. 1981), vacated, 455 U.S. 591 (1982).
79. Id.
80. Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591 (1982).
81. Judge Sneed, in his dissent to the Ninth Circuit majority opinion on remand from Mata I,
indicated he thought the Court in Mata I found the issue of whether the photo identification was
impermissibly suggestive to be an issue of fact entitled to a presumption of correctness under
2254(d). 649 F.2d at 717 (Sneed, J., dissenting).
82. 455 U.S. at 597 (emphasis added).
10
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statutory presumption applies.8 3
The Court notes that the distinction between law and fact is not always
easily made,84 and this seems particularly true in this case. At least the
question of whether the witnesses were under pressure from prison offi-
cials or others seems to require a finding that takes it out of the realm of
being a "basic, primary or historical fact [ ]. . . 'in the sense of a reci-
tal of external events and the credibility of their narrators .... ' "85
Even though any suggestiveness in a photo identification procedures con-
tinues to be a mixed question, the potential remains for treating such
questions as factual issues, because what are termed the underlying ques-
tions of fact may encompass more than a recital of external events. Thus,
while the Mata II decision allays Professor Reynolds' fear that the
suggestiveness of photo identification procedures will ultimately be
treated as an issue of fact, such potential still remains.
On remand from Mata II, the Ninth Circuit meticulously reviewed the
trial transcript and the findings of the California Court of Appeal, and
specifically held that the findings were "not fairly supported by the rec-
ord [section 2254(d)(8)] and, therefore, need not be accorded the pre-
sumption of correctness mandated by section 2254. ' ,86 As Mata II
required, the Ninth Circuit made a finding of fact regarding each of the
factors indicating a witness' ability to make an accurate identification.8 7
Against these factors the court weighed the indicia of the corrupting ef-
fect of the photographic identification procedure."" On balance, after
giving due deference to the state court findings that were fairly supported
by the record, it was held that the procedures employed were so imper-
missibly suggestive as to make likely an irreparable misidentification. 9
And again, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court.
Judge Sneed dissented from the Ninth Circuit majority opinion. 90 In
his dissent, he noted the case of Lonberger v. Jago as a similar case which
was on certiorari to the Supreme Court at that time.91 That case is the
subject of discussion in the next section.
83. Id. (emphasis in original).
84. Id. at 598.
85. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 309 n.6 (1963) (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 506
(1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.)).
86. Mata v. Sumner, 696 F.2d 1244, 1251 (9th Cir. 1983), vacated and remanded to dismiss as
moot, 104 S. Ct. 386 (1984).
87. 696 F.2d at 1251-53. These factors include: (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the
criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness'
prior description of the criminal; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the con-
frontation; and (5) the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.
88. Id. at 1253-55.
89. Id. at 1255.
90. Id. at 1256 (Sneed, J., dissenting). For the discussion of Judge Sneed's proposed standard
for not fairly supported by the record, section 2254(d)(8), see infra text accompanying notes 136-60.
91. Id. at 1258 n.2.
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While the most recent Ninth Circuit decision apparently ends the tug-
of-war between that court and the Supreme Court, the potential remains
for mixed questions to be transformed into issues of fact. In its opinion
following Mata I, the Ninth Circuit had determined that a mixed ques-
tion was involved. In Mata II, the Supreme Court channeled the Ninth
Circuit's subsequent opinion into reliance on section 2254(d)(8) by its
determination of what issues were questions of fact, even though at least
one of those issues arguably involved more than a recital of external
events on their narrator's credibility.
Moreover, the struggle between the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme
Court added very little to the search for a standard to guide lower federal
courts in deciding when a state court factual determination is not fairly
supported by the record under section 2254(d)(8). Neither court articu-
lated a standard for when state court findings are not fairly supported by
the record, and this failure is disturbing because the case eventually
turned on such a conclusion.
IV. THE LONBERGER CASE
The Lonberger case shuttled back and forth between the Sixth Circuit
and the Supreme Court much like the Mata case did between the Ninth
Circuit and the Court. Involved are two opinions by the Sixth Circuit
and an ultimate decision by the Court.
The Lonberger case represents the application of the Mata I require-
ments on habeas corpus in the context of the determination of the volun-
tariness of a guilty plea. As in the latest Ninth Circuit opinion, the Sixth
Circuit relied on section 2254(d)(8) in deciding that the voluntariness of
the defendant's guilty plea was not fairly supported by the record.92 The
Court, however, rejected the Sixth Circuit's argument, holding that the
latter had erroneously applied that section.93 Again, neither the Supreme
Court nor the court of appeals articulated a clear standard for when a
state court factual determination is not fairly supported by the record,
although the Court made a passing reference to such a standard. 94 This
case can best be discussed by first setting forth the facts as gleaned from
the two Sixth Circuit opinions and that of the Supreme Court.
Under Ohio law, the defendant, Robert Lonberger, was convicted of
aggravated murder by a jury with a "specification" which resulted in the
death penalty under the Ohio sentencing enhancement statute.95 The
92. Lonberger v. Jago, 651 F.2d 447, 449 (6th Cir. 1981), rev'd sub noa., Marshall v.
Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422 (1983).
93. Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422 (1983) (Lonberger I).
94. Id. at 432.
95. Lonberger v. Jago, 635 F.2d 1189, 1189 (6th Cir. 1980), vacated, 451 U.S. 902 (1981).
12
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 1 [1984], Art. 6
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol15/iss1/6
98 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
victim had bled to death from a neck wound.96
The indictment contained two counts of "aggravated murder." Both
counts included a "specification," wherein the prosecution charged that
the defendant previously had been convicted of purposefully killing or
attempting to kill another.97 Under Ohio law, a sentence of death is pos-
sible only upon the defendant separately being found guilty of aggravated
murder and a specification.98
At trial, the state introduced three items of documentary evidence in
an attempt to prove Lonberger's prior conviction in Cook County, Illi-
nois, of the attempted murder of Dorothy Maxwell. 99 These items in-
cluded: (1) a copy of the Illinois grand jury indictment, (2) a certified
copy of an Illinois record known as a "conviction statement", and (3) a
transcript of the Illinois court hearing at which the defendant pled
guilty.10° The controversy between the Sixth Circuit and the Court con-
cerning the voluntariness of the defendant's guilty plea to attempted
murder centered around the absence of the words "attempted murder"
and "murder" in the conviction statement and in the transcript, respec-
tively. 01 The conviction statement recited only that the defendant had
pled guilty to "AGGRAVATED BATTERY, ETC.""0 2 The transcript
showed that the Illinois judge questioned the defendant as to whether he
understood he was pleading guilty to aggravated battery and whether
"'you did on the same date attempt on Dorothy Maxwell, with a knife
' ,103
Prior to the trial, the Ohio court held a hearing in limine to determine
the voluntariness of the defendant's guilty plea to attempted murder in
Illinois. 14 The state offered the documentary evidence, and the defend-
ant took the stand.105 The defendant testified that he had not been ap-
prised of the Illinois charges, that his attorney told him he was pleading
guilty only to aggravated battery, and that he never personally received
or read the indictment.106
The Ohio trial court made three sets of findings concerning the defend-
ant's Illinois guilty plea. On the basis of the evidence, the court found
that the defendant was an intelligent individual, that- he was well versed
in the criminal processes, and that he was well represented by competent
96. Id. at 1191.
97. Lonberger II, 459 U.S. at 425.
98. Lonberger v. Jago, 635 F.2d at 1190 n.3.
99. Lonberger II, 459 U.S. at 426-27.




104. Id. at 428.
105. Id.
106. Lonberger v. Jago, 635 F.2d at 1195.
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counsel in Illinois. 1°7 The trial' court also found that every effort was
made to protect the defendant's constitutional rights.1"8 On the basis of
these two sets of findings, the Ohio trial court found that the defendant
had voluntarily and intelligently pled guilty in Illinois. 1°9
The jury found the defendant guilty on the second count of aggravated
murder and on the corresponding specification.11° The Ohio Court of
Appeals reversed the defendant's conviction of aggravated murder be-
cause the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of
rape or the identity of the defendant as the rapist.1 11 The Ohio appellate
court did uphold the jury finding that the defendant was guilty of the
lesser included offense of murder and that the specification concerning
the Illinois conviction of attempted murder was adequately proved. 112
With respect to the admissibility and evidence of the prior Illinois con-
viction, the Ohio Court of Appeals found that the trial court had not
erred in its ruling that the guilty plea was voluntarily and knowingly
made and that it should be',submitted to the jury as evidence.113 The
appellate court also found that the defendant had stipulated, through his
counsel, that the facts were sufficient to sustain the charges in the indict-
ment. 114 Upon exhausting his state court remedies, the defendant sought
a writ of habeas corpus from the district court, but the petition was de-
nied. 1 The defendant appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
In its first opinion, the Sixth Circuit, without referring to section
2254(d), reversed the district court's dismissal of the defendant's motion
for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the state of Ohio had
failed to meet its burden of showing that the defendant understood the
nature of the prior Illinois charge to which he pled guilty. 116 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and summarily vacated the judgment
and remanded the case for consideration in light of Mata .117
On remand, the Sixth Circuit attempted to follow the Mata I require-
ments necessary to rebut the presumption of correctness accorded to
state court fact findings under section 2254(d). In explaining its reasons
for departing from the state court findings of fact, as Mata I required, the
court made a one sentence notation that the Ohio trial court had made
107. Lonberger II, 459 U.S. at 428.
108. Id. at 429.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Lonberger v. Jago, 635 F.2d at 1191.
112. Lonberger II, 459 U.S. at 429. The judgment imposing the death penalty was reversed, and
the court "directed imposition of a sentence based solely on the conviction of murder." Id.
113. Id. at 430.
114. Id.
115. Lonberger v. Jago, 635 F.2d at 1191.
116. Id. at 1195.
117. Marshall v. Lonberger, 451 U.S. 902 (1981).
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no explicit findings regarding Lonberger's testimony as a witness.1 18
This statement became significant in the subsequent Supreme Court
opinion. The Sixth Circuit expressly held that the Ohio courts' factual
determination that Lonberger had intelligently pled guilty to attempted
murder in Illinois was not fairly supported by the record under section
2254(d)(8). 119
The Sixth Circuit's chief rationale for invoking 2254(d)(8) was its find-
ing that the transcript of Lonberger's plea of guilty, in Illinois, to at-
tempted murder was inadequate to show his awareness of pleading to
that charge. 20 According to Sixth Circuit law, when a transcript is inad-
equate the state must make a clear and convincing showing that the plea
was knowingly and understandingly made, and the state failed to make
such a showing. 21 In particular, Lonberger testified that he had not
heard of the "attempt" charge either at his arraignment or from his at-
torneys, and the state produced no evidence to the contrary.122
In Lonberger II, the Supreme Court took an approach similar to its
opinion in Mata II. The Court made the same ultimate conclusion/un-
derlying facts distinction it had made in Mata II. It agreed with the
Sixth Circuit that the standard of whether a guilty plea is voluntary for
federal constitutional purposes is a question of federal law, and not a
question of fact subject to section 2254(d).123 As in Mata II, the Court
set out what it considered to be the underlying questions of fact governed
by section 2254(d), including: "what the Illinois records show with re-
spect to respondent's [Lonberger's] 1972 guilty plea, what other infer-
ences regarding those historical facts the . . . Sixth Circuit could
properly draw, and related questions ... ,,124
In holding that the Sixth Circuit had erroneously applied the "fairly
supported by the record" exception contained in section 2254(d)(8), the
Court focused on the defendant's testimony at the Ohio pre-trial hearing
regarding his guilty plea in Illinois.'25 The Court rephrased the language
of section 2254(d)(8) and found that for that section to apply, the Sixth
Circuit "must conclude that the state court findings lacked even 'fair sup-
port' in the record."' 26 Based upon this "standard," the Court held that
"[t]he Court of Appeals' treatment of the issue of respondent's credibility
failed to satisfy this standard."1 27 First, even though the Ohio trial court
118. Lonberger v. Jago, 651 F.2d at 448.
119. Id. at 449.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 450.
123. Lonberger I, 459 U.S. at 431.
124. Id. at 431-32.
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failed to make express findings regarding the defendant's credibility as a
witness, in terms of his knowledge of the charges to which he pled guilty
in Illinois, the trial court's admission of the prior conviction into evi-
dence, for purposes of proving the specification, was equivalent to that
court's refusal to credit the defendant's testimony.128 Second, for pur-
poses of deciding whether state court factual findings are fairly supported
by the record, a federal habeas court may not redetermine the credibility
of witnesses. 12 9 Finally, the Court found that the presumption that
Lonberger had been informed of the Illinois attempted murder charges
had not been rebutted. 130
If the Court's statement that "lack of fair support" is to be taken as the
standard for the language "not fairly supported by the record" in section
2254(d)(8), it is of little help to lower federal courts in defining what the
latter phrase means. Thus, the federal courts remain without any com-
prehensive guide for determining when a state court factual finding is not
fairly supported by the record.
V. A STANDARD FOR "NOT FAIRLY SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD"
Section 2254(d)(8) provides that a state court factual determination,
after a hearing on the merits, is to be presumed correct by a federal
habeas court unless the latter court, after considering such part of the
record as a whole, concludes that the "factual determination is not fairly
supported by the record." 131 It has been noted that the purpose of the
fair support criterion is to provide "a minimal check on the earlier [state]
court's reasoning and impartiality, a necessary check if the prior factual
conclusions - not merely the data generated and recorded - are to be
adopted by the habeas court."' 132
Some federal judges have suggested certain standards be used in deter-
128. Id.
129. Id. at 434. The Court quoted from United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S.
326 (1952), to the effect that the trial court findings regarding the credibility of witnesses must be
given deference because only such courts have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the wit-
nesses. Id. at 339. The case involved review within the federal court system of a district court's
denial of an injunction sought by the organized medical profession against "contract practice." Id.
On the other hand, it has been noted that where documentary evidence is involved, no such defer-
ence is required on review within the federal court system. See Pullman-Standard, Inc. v. Swint, 456
U.S. 273, 301-02 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (case involving discriminatory intent in a labor
union seniority system).
If these "within system" rules are applied to "between systems" review, it is evident that the
degree of deference accorded to state court findings will, in part, be dependent upon whether a case
is categorized as turning upon documentary or oral evidence. In the case under discussion, the Sixth
Circuit focused on the documentary evidence, but the Supreme Court focused on the defendant's
testimony, thus a higher degree of deference was required.
130. Lonberger II, 459 U.S. at 435-36.
131. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(8) (1982).
132. Note, supra note 4, at 1132.
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mining when a state court factual finding is not fairly supported by the
record. Judge Sneed, in his dissent to the most recent Ninth Circuit ma-
jority opinion in the Mata case, stated that an "any evidence" standard
be used to evaluate the section 2254(d)(8) exception.1 33 In Alderman v.
Austin, 134 a Fifth Circuit case, Judge Fay, in his dissent, suggested that
the "clearly erroneous" standard of Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, be used to determine when state court findings of fact are not
fairly supported by the record. 135 The appropriateness of these standards
will be reviewed.
A. The "'Any Evidence" Standard
Judge Sneed notes that because section 2254(d) was enacted in re-
sponse to Townsend v. Sain, one must turn to that case to discern the
meaning of the statute. 136 Judge Sneed adds that Townsend refers to
Blackburn v. Alabama and&Fiske v. Kansas for the definition of "fairly
support." "According to these cases, a finding is not fairly supported by
the record if it is 'shown by the record to be without evidence to support
it.' "37 Judge Sneed concludes that proper application of section
2254(d)(8) requires one to ask "whether there is any evidence in the rec-
ord to support the state court's finding of fact."' 38 If any such evidence
can be found in the record, then the state court findings must be pre-
sumed correct, unless the state prisoner can show convincing evidence
that the factual finding was erroneous. 39 However, the argument has
been made that the Blackburn and Fiske cases are inappropriate to sup-
port the use of the "any evidence" standard to evaluate when a state
court finding of fact is not fairly supported by the record.
The Court, in Townsend, cited Blackburn and Fiske as examples of
when "state factual determinations not fairly supported by the record
cannot be conclusive of federal rights."'" In Fiske v. Kansas,141 the
Court said it would "review the finding of facts by a [s]tate court where a
federal right has been denied as the result of a finding shown by the rec-
ord to be without evidence to support it ... ."142 In Fiske, the Court
held that the defendant was denied due process in the application of a
criminal syndicalism statute to him, because there was no evidence at all
133. Mata v. Sumner, 696 F.2d at 1257 (Sneed, J., dissenting).
134. 695 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1983) (en bane).
135. Id. at 132-33 (Fay, J., dissenting). Judge Roney joined in Judge Fay's dissent.
136. 696 F.2d at 1257 (Sneed, J., dissenting).
137. Id. (quoting Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 385 (1927)). Judge Sneed notes that Blackburn
v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 208-09 (1960), makes a similar finding.
138. Id. (emphasis in original).
139. Id.
140. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 316-17 (1963).
141. 274 U.S. 380 (1977).
142. Id. at 385.
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that the organization, for which defendant solicited membership, advo-
cated unlawful acts or methods in accomplishing its ends.143 Wright and
Sofaer argue that "[t]hese cases [Blackburn and Fiske] do not establish a
scope of review for judging findings based on conflicting evidence; rather
they deal with the legal question whether there is such an absence of
evidence that due process is violated." 1" Thus, these cases represent
questions of law, and, as such, they are not relevant to the issue of
whether a state court fact finding is not fairly supported by the record.
Questions of law are not subject to section 2254(d).145
In Townsend, the Court stated that a federal habeas court has the same
exacting duty to scrutinize the state court record as the Supreme Court
has on direct review. 14  To indicate the extent of this exacting duty, the
Court cited Blackburn v. Alabama and Moore v. Michigan, both of which
came to the Court on direct review.147 However, these cases are largely
irrelevant to the issue of whether a state court's finding of fact is not
fairly supported by the record, because they involve mixed questions of
fact and law.14 Mixed questions are not subject to section 2254(d). 149
It can be seen that the Fiske, Blackburn, and Moore cases are inappo-
site as examples of when a state court factual determination is not fairly
supported by the record under section 2254(d)(8). These cases represent
the examination of questions of law or mixed questions by the Supreme
Court on direct review. Had these cases arisen on habeas, they would
have been reviewed by the federal district court, but not because of the
operation of the section 2254(d)(8). Rather, they would have been re-
viewed because they involved questions of law or mixed questions, which
issues are reviewable independent of that section of the statute. If these
cases truly fall under section 2254(d)(8), then the Supreme Court on di-
143. Id. at 387.
144. Wright & Sofaer, Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners. The Allocation of Fact-Finding
Responsibility, 75 YALE L.J. 895, 946 (1966). (emphasis added). This article was published in May,
1966, just prior to the enactment of section 2254(d). Therefore, all references are to Townsend with
respect to the discussion of when state court findings of fact are not fairly supported by the record.
Id. at 946-53. However, it should be noted that Judge J. Shelly Wright, co-author of the article, was
a member of the Judicial Conference Habeas Corpus Committee which drafted the section 2254(d)
amendment which was enacted by Congress. S. REP. No. 1797, supra note 19, at 3. As a member of
the drafting committee, he was certainly intimately familiar with section 2254(d)(8) and the intended
meaning of when a state court factual determination is not fairly supported by the record.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 53-56.
146. Townsend, 372 U.S. at 316.
147. Id.
148. Note, supra note 4, at 1133 n.82. See Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 208-09 (1960)
(voluntariness of murder confession of defendant who was confined to mental hospital shortly after
arrest and confession, four years later found competent to stand trial, tried and convicted; deposition
of doctor on lunacy commission regarding defendant's sanity at time of confession was "in such
hopeless internal conflict that it raises no genuine issue of fact"); see also Moore v. Michigan, 355
U.S. 155 (1957) (fear of mob violence planted in defendant's mind raised the inference that his
waiver of counsel prior to his guilty plea was not intelligently and understandingly made).
149. See supra text accompanying notes 53-56.
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rect review and the federal habeas court on collateral review, under that
section, would be functioning identically in examining mixed questions
and questions of law.
If the role of the habeas court were limited to the functions of the Court
on direct review, there would never be any need for a fact-finding hearing
on this ground [section 2254(d)(8)]. So if the habeas fact-finding hearing
is to perform any function in the review of the sufficiency of evidence, the
habeas court must have a greater obligation than the Supreme Court on
direct review. 5°
That the role of the habeas court is not identical to that of the Supreme
Court is evidenced by the requirement that the former review the record
as a whole.' The habeas court is required to review both the undisputed
and disputed portions of the record, whereas only the disputed portion of
the record is examined on direct review.' 2 Because the habeas court is
not in the same role as the Court on direct review, "[t]he 'fairly sup-
ported' formulation, therefore, must mean more than merely a review to
determine whether any evidence supports a finding.""' 3
The case of Norris v. Alabama"5 4 has been cited as one instance in
which the Supreme Court, on direct review, engaged in the weighing of
conflicting evidence.' The Court rarely plays such a role with respect
to state findings of historical fact.' 56 In Norris, the Court rejected the
testimony of state officials that even though no black had served on a jury
within the memory of life-long residents of the county, blacks were not
systematically excluded from jury duty.157 The state officials' testimony
was rejected on the basis of other uncontroverted testimony that there
were a number of blacks qualified for jury service. 5 Because the
Supreme Court, on direct review, rarely weighs conflicting evidence as it
did in Norris, it is essential that the federal habeas court do so where the
state court findings of fact are not fairly supported by the record. 5 9
Otherwise, constitutional violations may not be rectified for lack of
review.
Judge Sneed's suggestion that the "any evidence" standard be used to
determine when a state court factual finding is not fairly supported by
the record is inapposite."6 The standard is more properly applied when
150. Wright & Sofaer, supra note 144, at 947.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. (emphasis in original).
154. 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
155. Note, supra note 4, at 1133 n.82. See also Wright & Sofaer, supra note 144, at 947 n.176.
156. Note, supra note 4, at 1133 n.82.
157. 294 U.S. at 596-99.
158. Id. at 597.
159. Note, supra note 4, at 1133 n.82.
160. The Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), held that the "no evidence" stan-
dard of Thompson v. Louisville could not be used on federal habeas corpus in evaluating whether a
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questions of law or mixed questions are at issue. Moreover, use of the
"any evidence" standard with respect to section 2254(d)(8) would re-
strict the federal habeas court's ability to protect the federal constitu-
tional rights of state prisoners.
B. The "Clearly Erroneous" Standard
Judge Fay, in his dissent in Alderman v. Austin,161 suggested that the
"clearly erroneous" standard of Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure be used to evaluate whether state court factual determinations
are not fairly supported by the record under section 2254(d)(8).' 62 Rule
52 is applicable in federal appellate review.' 63 The Supreme Court has
expressed its willingness to accept a standard of review for section
2254(d)(8) that is familiar in federal appellate review. "We greatly doubt
that Congress, when it used the language, 'fairly supported by the record'
considered 'as a whole' intended to authorize broader federal review of
state court credibility determinations than are authorized in appeals
within the federal system itself.' 64 The "clearly erroneous" standard
necessary element of a crime has been proved. The Court said: "[I]n a challenge to a state criminal
conviction brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.... the applicant is entitled to habeas corpus relief if it
is found that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 324.
This case does not alter the argument made in this section of the comment; rather, it supports the
contention that Judge Sneed's suggested use of the "any evidence" standard is inapposite.
Following a bench trial, a Virginia court convicted defendant of first degree murder. Id. at 309.
Defendant had sought relief on the ground that there was insufficient evidence of premeditation, a
necessary element of first degree murder. Id. at 311 & n.2, 312.
In re Winship established the constitutional requirement that a criminal conviction will not stand
unless every fact necessary to constitute the crime is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 315.
The question in Jackson was whether this rule should be applied in federal habeas corpus. Id. at
312-13. The Court distinguished the Thompson "no evidence" criterion from the "guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt standard," in that the former involved no question of the sufficiency of the evi-
dence, while the latter did. Id. at 314.
In Jackson, the Court indicated that the In re Winship standard involved a mixed question of fact
and law. The Court cited Blackburn v. Alabama as an instance of when the application of a constitu-
tional standard requires a federal court to assess the facts. Id. at 318. Townsend is then cited for the
proposition that the same duty obtains no habeas corpus. Id. As has already been noted, Blackburn
and its application in habeas corpus signify a mixed question of fact and law not subject to section
2254(d). See supra notes 140-49 and accompanying text.
The Court's only reference to section 2254 was to subsection (a) to the effect that a state prisoner's
application for a writ of habeas corpus must be entertained when he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution of the United States. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 320-21. Section 2254(d)(8) was never men-
tioned.
The above indicates that the Jackson standard is not to be used in the section 2254(d)(8) determi-
nation of when a state court finding of fact is not fairly supported by the evidence. The "guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt" standard involves the application of a federal standard to the facts as
found-a mixed question of fact and law not subject to section 2254(d).
161. 695 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1983) (en bane).
162. 695 F.2d at 133 (Fay, J., dissenting).
163. FED. R. Cv. P. 52(a).
164. Lonberger II, 459 U.S. at 434-35.
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would serve this purpose.
In Alderman, a federal habeas corpus case, the en banc majority
adopted the panel's holding that defendant's sixth amendment right to an
impartial jury had been violated by the exclusion of three veniremen,
who, while stating that they could vote for the death penalty, expressed
doubts about their ability to write out and sign such a verdict if selected
as jury foreperson 1 65 After noting the majority's failure to mention sec-
tion 2254(d), contrary to the Mata I requirement, Judge Fay surmised
that the state court findings of fact had been rejected by the majority
under section 2254(d)(8). 6 6 Then, the view is adopted that the "fairly
supported by the record" standard of section 2254(d)(8) is the same as
the "clearly erroneous" standard.1 67
The classic definition of "clearly erroneous" comes from the Supreme
Court. "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence
to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."' 168 Rule
52 governs the effect of lower federal court findings of fact on appellate
review. "In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an
advisory jury. . . [flindings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." '169 Judge Fay and others
seek to apply this "within system" federal appellate review standard to
the "between systems" review by federal habeas courts of state court
findings of fact.
Several commentators have suggested that the "clearly erroneous"
standard be applied to section 2254(d)(8). Use of the "clearly erroneous"
standard was proposed even before the enactment of section 2254(d)(8)
in connection with the Townsend criterion which eventually was embod-
ied in that section. 70  The test was thought to prevent total abandon-
ment of federal review of state findings, while ensuring that federal
judges do not merely substitute their own judgments for those of state
courts. 171
Wright and Sofaer also advocate that the "clearly erroneous" standard
be used in determining when state court findings of fact are not fairly
supported by the record.'72 The standard was favored because of its gen-
165. Alderman, 695 F.2d at 126; see Alderman v. Austin, 663 F.2d 558, 562-64 (5th Cir. 1982).
166. Alderman, 695 F.2d at 132.
167. Id. at 132-34.
168. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
169. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
170. Note, Federal Habeas Corpus Treatment of State Factiinding: A Suggested Approach, 76
HARv. L. REv. 1253, 1262 (1963).
171. Id.
172. Wright & Sofaer, supra note 144, at 948. The substantial evidence test used in reviewing
administrative decisions and a scope of review broader than the "clearly erroneous" standard were
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eral applicability and its flexibility to handle credibility issues. "The
standard applies whether or not there were conflicts in testimony and
simply becomes narrower when credibility is involved." '173 In stating
that "[a]pplication of the clearly erroneous standard entails evidence
evaluation,"1 74 the authors argue that generalizations about types of evi-
dence can only offer guidance in this task. 75 Generally, reviewing courts
are to defer to findings based upon credibility, but demeanor evidence
can be as deceiving as it is helpful. 76
The plain fact is that reviewing courts do test the credibility of witnesses,
by reference to such factors as corroboration, interest in the outcome,
reputation, degree of recall, internal consistency of the testimony, the
likelihood of the story in light of common experience and knowledge, and
whether the witness behaved in a manner strongly at variance with the
way in which we would expect a similary situated person to behave. 177
Similarly, Wright and Sofaer argue that the generalization that documen-
tary evidence is inherently more valuable than testimony is not especially
helpful, because a useful comparison is difficult to make when the value
of the former and of the latter varies from case to case.1 78 The authors'
point is that any application of the "clearly erroneous" standard to the
evaluation of state court findings of fact should not be completely ruled
by generalizations about the type of evidence under scrutiny. Relying on
the Wright and Sofaer analysis, the author of Developments in the Law-
Federal Habeas Corpus179 takes the position that "'fair support' should
be construed as broadly as the 'clearly erroneous' standard."
180
In his dissent, Judge Fay cites several cases as holding that the statu-
tory standard of fairly supported by the record is equivalent to the
"clearly erroneous" standard. 81 In Leavitt v. Howard,1 82 the First Cir-
cuit said, "[w]e read the 'fair support' standard [of section 2254(d)(8)] as
authorizing the district court in habeas cases to review the state court
findings by the same 'clearly erroneous' standard employed in federal
appellate review of trial findings . . ,. . For this view, the Develop-
also discussed. Id. The former was rejected as too narrow. Id. at 949. The latter was rejected
because of the danger it would lead to complete relitigation of numerous state court judgments. Id.
at 950.
173. Id. at 950.




178. Id. at 951-52.
179. Note, supra note 4.
180. Id. at 1133 & n.83.
181. Alderman, 695 F.2d at 132 (Fay, J., dissenting).
182. 462 F.2d 992 (1st Cir.), cerL denied, 409 U.S. 884 (1972).
183. Id. at 996 (habeas case involving consent to search of automobile; state court not mistaken
in believing testimony of police witnesses over uncorroborated testimony of defendant and his wife).
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ments note was cited.184 Citing Leavitt and Developments, the Fourth
Circuit came to the same conclusion in Wright v. North Carolina,185 a
habeas case involving the voluntariness of a confession. Judge Fay also
cites Moore v. Ballone,18 6 a Fourth Circuit case, but that opinion never
mentions section 2254(d)(8). Rather, the Fourth Circuit seems to be ap-
plying the "clearly erroneous" standard to the last paragraph of section
2254(d) under which a state prisoner, who cannot rebut the presumption
of correctness under paragraphs one through eight, may still do so by
establishing by "convincing evidence that the factual determination...
was erroneous." ' 7 Leavitt and Wright do hold that the "fair support"
standard of section 2254(d)(8) is the same as the "clearly erroneous"
standard used in federal appellate review, primarily on the strength of
the Developments note and the authority cited therein.
Assuming the "clearly erroneous" standard is adopted as the standard
of review for when a state finding of fact is not fairly supported by the
record, the question becomes how much of this established "within sys-
tems" doctrine is applicable to the "between systems" review of federal
habeas corpus. It has been suggested that the Supreme Court's interpre-
tation of rule 52(a) regarding the "clearly erroneous" standard, expressed
in Pullman-Standard, Inc. v. Swint, be applied to federal habeas
corpus. 1 8 8
Pullman-Standard, Inc. v. Swint 89 involved the question of intent to
discriminate in a union seniority system under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. The case turned on whether the Fifth Circuit had
misapplied the "clearly erroneous" standard of rule 52 to the district
court's finding that any disparities resulting from the seniority system
were not the result of intentional racial discrimination. 190 The Fifth Cir-
cuit had attempted to distinguish the ultimate issue of discrimination
from findings of subsidiary fact made by the district court. The court of
appeals would be bound only by the district court's findings of subsidiary
fact which were not clearly erroneous. The Fifth Circuit said:
Although discrimination vel non is essentially a question of fact it is, at
the same time, the ultimate issue for resolution in this case .... As
such, a finding of discrimination or non-discrimination is a finding of
ultimate fact. In reviewing the district court's findings, therefore, we will
proceed to make an independent determination of appellant's allegations
of discrimination, though bound by findings of subsidiary fact which are
184. Id.
185. 483 F.2d 405, 408 (4th Cir. 1973).
186. 658 F.2d 218 (4th Cir. 1981) (habeas case involving voluntariness of confession).
187. Id. at 223, 226 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1976)).
188. Aldennan, 695 F.2d at 133 (Fay, J., dissenting).
189. 456 U.S. 273 (1982).
190. Id. at 275-76.
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themselves not clearly erroneous. 19 1
This distinction would free the court of appeals to decide the issue of
intent to discriminate.
The Supreme Court found that the court of appeals' independent de-
termination of intent to discriminate, which the latter had termed an is-
sue of "ultimate fact," was error under rule 52.192 With respect to rule
52 and the "clearly erroneous" standard, the Court said:
Rule 52(a) broadly requires that findings of fact not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous. It does not make exceptions or purport to exclude
certain categories of factual findings from the obligation of a court of
appeals to accept a district court's findings unless clearly erroneous. It
does not divide facts into categories; in particular, it does not divide find-
ings of fact into those that deal with "ultimate" and those that deal with
"subsidiary" facts. 19 3
Under this view of rule 52 and the "clearly erroneous" standard, no dis-
tinction is recognized between "ultimate" facts and "subsidiary" facts.
The Court specifically went on to hold that the issue of "whether the
differential impact of the seniority system reflected an intent to discrimi-
nate on account of race. . . is a pure question of fact, subject to Rule
52(a)'s clearly-erroneous standard [and] not a question of law and not a
mixed question of law and fact."
194
In Pullman, the Supreme Court recognized that the Fifth Circuit con-
sidered the term "ultimate facts" to be synonomous with mixed ques-
tions of law and fact.19 5 Further, the Court recognized that it had
indicated "ultimate" facts and mixed questions were equivalents. 19
6
Mixed questions of fact and law are independently reviewable. But, in-
tent to discriminate, which had been thought by the Fifth Circuit to be a
mixed question, was found to be a pure question of fact. As such, it was
subject to the "clearly erroneous" standard of rule 52.
The Court's analysis in recent habeas corpus cases, involving "between
systems" review, is strikingly similar to the Court's analysis in Pullman,
a "within system" case. In Mata II, the Court recognized that the ulti-
mate question of the constitutionality of pretrial identification procedures
was a mixed question independently reviewable apart from section
2254(d). Similarly, in Lonberger II, the Court recognized that the issue
of the voluntariness of a guilty plea was a mixed question not subject to
section 2254(d). In both Mata II and Lonberger II, the Supreme Court
191. Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 624 F.2d 525, 533 n.6 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting East v. Romine,
Inc., 518 F.2d 332, 339 (5th Cir. 1975)).
192. Pullman, 456 U.S. at 285-88.
193. Id. at 287.
194. Id. at 287-88.
195. Id. at 286 n.16.
196. Id.
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found underlying questions of fact. In these cases, and in Pullman, the
Court explicitly determined what were mixed questions and what were
pure questions of fact.
In Mata II and Lonberger II, it was the underlying questions of fact
which were subject to the "not fairly supported by the record" standard
of section 2254(d)(8). If the "clearly erroneous" standard was adopted to
determine when state court factual findings are not fairly supported by
the record, it should be applied only to these so-called underlying ques-
tions of fact.
Even if the "clearly erroneous" standard was applied only to the un-
derlying questions of fact, there would still be a certain inconsistency in
applying the "clearly erroneous" standard of federal appellate review in
the context of habeas corpus review. The Supreme Court, in Townsend v.
Sain, said:
The whole history of the writ - its unique development - refutes a con-
struction of the federal courts' habeas corpus powers that would assimi-
late their task to that of courts of appellate review. The function on
habeas is different. It is to test by way of an original civil proceeding,
independent of the normal channels of review of criminal judgments, the
very gravest allegations.197
The Court recognized that the function of habeas corpus was not the
same as federal appellate review. Habeas corpus was to provide an in-
dependent review of state criminal judgments "free from the momentum
of the guilt-determining process."19
While advocating the adoptions of the "clearly erroneous" standard of
federal appellate review to evaluate whether there is fair support in the
state court record under section 2254(d)(8), Wright and Sofaer said:
If the role of the habeas court were limited to the functions of the Court
on direct review, there would never be any need for a fact-finding hearing
on this ground [section 2254(d)(8)]. So if the habeas fact-finding hearing
is to perform any function in the review of the sufficiency of evidence, the
habeas court must have a greater obligation than the Supreme Court on
direct review. 199
Thus, even those who advocate the use of the "clearly erroneous" stan-
dard under section 2254(d)(8) recognize that the role of federal courts is
not the same in habeas corpus review as it is in appellate review.
If, as the Court and commentators suggest, the function of federal
habeas corpus review is different from the function of federal appellate
review, the question must be asked: why use a standard of federal appel-
late review in the context of habeas corpus review when these types of
197. 372 U.S. at 311-12.
198. Note, supra note 4, at 1132.
199. Wright & Sofaer, supra note 144, at 947. See supra text accompanying notes 150-53 for the
discussion of this statement in the context of the "any evidence" standard.
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review serve divergent functions? To do so would impose a restrictive
federal appellate review standard on the special function of habeas
corpus review to independently examine state court criminal judgments
outside of the trial process so that federal constitutional rights may be
protected.
VI. CONCLUSION
The failure of the United States Supreme Court to clearly articulate a
standard for when a state court factual determination is not fairly sup-
ported by the record pursuant to section 2254(d)(8) has made exceed-
ingly difficult the lower federal courts' task of applying this section of the
statute. The problem has been exacerbated by the difficulty, admitted by
the Court itself, of distinguishing among questions of fact, mixed ques-
tions of law and fact, and questions of law.
In Mata -I and Lonberger II, issues which had been perceived as
mixed questions, which are reviewable independent of section 2254(d)(8),
were transformed into two-level issues. The more general level was
termed the ultimate mixed question; the other was termed the underlying
question of fact. Such an analysis will require the federal courts in
habeas review to make more determinations about what issues are mixed
questions and what issues are pure questions of fact. In Pullman, the
Court recognized the vexing problem of distinguishing factual from legal
issues. Nevertheless, such distinctions are critical, because state court
conclusions on mixed questions and questions of law may not be given
binding weight on habeas. Ultimately, the Supreme Court will of neces-
sity be required to make difficult and explicit decisions about what are,
and what are not, questions of fact for purposes of habeas corpus review
under section 2254(d)(8).
The Court, in Mata II and Lonberger II, gave the lower federal courts
no clear standard for evaluating when state court findings of fact, espe-
cially those regarding credibility, are not fairly supported by the record,
but it did seem willing to accept a standard familiar in federal appellate
review. While some standard is needed, neither the federal appellate
standard of "any evidence" nor of "clearly erroneous" is appropriate.
Neither of the standards suggested recognizes that federal habeas re-
view and federal appellate review serve different functions. Habeas
corpus review entails a special civil proceeding which is designed to as-
sure that state prisoners have not been denied federal constitutional
rights. Use of the "any evidence" standard does not recognize the special
nature of habeas review under section 2254(d)(8). It is a federal appellate
review standard used to evaluate mixed questions and questions of law.
The "clearly erroneous" standard of federal appellate review also is
not well suited to the task of evaluating fair support for the record under
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section 2254(d)(8). A broad view of the "clearly erroneous" standard
which did not strictly adhere to generalizations about types of evidence,
especially those requiring deference when witness credibility is at issue,
might be acceptable. Such a view would recognize the special function of
habeas. The danger is that this broad view of "clearly erroneous" would
not be taken, given the restrictive nature of the standard in federal appel-
late review as exemplified by the Pullman case. If this restrictive view of
"clearly erroneous" was carried over to habeas corpus review, the special
function of such review would not be served.
The unique nature of habeas corpus requires an equally unique stan-
dard to determine when state court findings of fact are not fairly sup-
ported by the record pursuant to section 2254(d)(8). To adequately
recognize the special nature of habeas corpus, the standard should be
broad and flexible. It can be argued, however, that a more expansive
standard ignores practical workload considerations. This argument
would be that a broad and flexible standard would result in an increase in
the number of habeas applications when the federal courts have been
receiving even greater numbers of these applications. While a more ex-
pansive standard may increase the number of petitions, it can be said, in
the relative sense, that the federal courts have not been overwhelmed
with habeas applications. State prisoner petitions to federal district
courts have remained constant for more than a decade. What is at issue,
then, is the absolute number of habeas petitions that are acceptable and
how many of those petitions result in a state court decision being over-
turned because the findings of fact are not fairly supported by the record.
The Court's present emphasis upon the interests of federalism indicates
an inclination toward holding constant or reducing the number of appli-
cations and toward upholding state court decisions. A unique standard
that is broad and flexible would run counter to these inclinations; but,
such a standard would recognize the uniqueness of the Great Writ.
GLENN F. LANG
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